Risks
Read this before you mine. Nothing here is softened.
Risks
Equimine (formerly MineStreet, then HoodMiner, then Stock Miner 2026-07-14; renamed Equimine 2026-08-27 - name only each time, every number unchanged by the renames; token ticker now $EQUIMINE, was $MINER, was $TICK; NFT symbol RIG).
This page is not a legal disclaimer we were told to write. It is the page we would want to read. Nothing on it is softened.
See also: Litepaper · Mechanics · FAQ
1. The model is inflow-dependent. Most of what you earn is other people's money.
Equimine is inflow-dependent. The money that pays miners is, overwhelmingly,
money that other people paid in. Our own Monte Carlo simulation - the Set U figure
sheet published in full at docs/tokenomics-cap-tuning.md
§9 - found that 78% of a typical buyer's lifetime earnings (85% for a first-day
buyer) are paid directly out of the mints of people who bought later, and that in the
v1 modelling, where the vault
held ETH rather than a tokenized stock, 100% of every payout was recycled buyer
capital with zero external yield. The tokenized-stock vault we actually shipped
adds real exogenous exposure - the vault genuinely holds the stock, so its price
movement and its corporate actions come from outside the system - but it does not
change the core of the thing: if purchases stop, payouts fall. And people who
arrive late earn substantially less than people who arrived early. The typical
(median) buyer ends the year having recovered about 0.64x of their mint price - a
~36% loss - and roughly 69% of all buyers never break even. That is not a tail risk
we are hedging against; it is the median outcome in our own best-case (growth) model.
Read that number again before you buy anything.
The detail, since you're still here
The pool that pays you is filled by three things: other people minting miners (75% of each mint, instantly), the vault dripping (1%/day of what it holds), and marketplace fees (20% of the 5% fee). The first of those is by far the largest, and it exists only for as long as people keep buying.
Our simulator pooled per-miner returns across 200 paths (the true population distribution). The realized-ROI distribution - as a multiple of your mint price - is blunt about who wins:
| Percentile | p5 | p10 | p25 | p50 (median) | p75 | p90 | p95 | mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| growth | 0.17x | 0.21x | 0.34x | 0.64x | 1.17x | 1.87x | 2.59x | 0.88x |
| dead launch (bust) | 0.15x | 0.19x | 0.36x | 0.68x | 1.25x | 2.05x | 2.25x | 0.89x |
Only the top ~30% of buyers (p75 and up) break even or better. A bottom-decile buyer recovers about a fifth of their money; the median recovers two-thirds. Note the shape: the mean (0.88x) and the capital-weighted return (0.94x) both sit above the 0.64x median, dragged up by a minority of early and whale winners - which is exactly why we quote the median as the typical result, never the mean. Do not read 0.88x as "what a buyer gets": most buyers get less.
The structure that produces this is not subtle: the pool is filled first by early buyers and drained first by early miners, and the hard supply caps mean primary inflow stops entirely once a ticker sells out. After that, the only money entering a pool is the vault drip and marketplace fees. Of every ETH minted, 93% is reachable by holders (75% pool + 13% vault + 5% insurance backstop) and only 7% is the protocol's permanent take (5% treasury + 2% buyback-burn) - and yet the typical buyer still recovers only 0.64x, because that reachable money is redistributed from late buyers to early ones, not shared evenly. Early founding-day cohorts ride to roughly 3x; the bottom decile ends near 0.21x.
That is a wealth transfer from late buyers to early buyers, and it is not a bug. It is the shape of the machine.
The vault is the one thing that pushes against this. It holds real tokenized stock, so it brings in real exogenous exposure and it keeps paying after minting stops. It is real. It is also not large enough to change the paragraph above, and you should not let it comfort you into thinking otherwise. And holding the underlying is not free: value swaps ETH → stock on the way in and stock → ETH on the way out, and in the worst governed case that round trip costs up to ~6% in swap spread (each leg is floored at 3% slippage). The vault buys real exposure; it is not a lossless store.
One more edge for the quick and well-resourced. Miners earn immediately, with no warm-up delay. The trade-off is that there is no anti-front-running window: a sophisticated actor can time a mint right before a large purchase lands and capture a share of it - one more way early and opportunistic participants come out ahead of ordinary buyers. What bounds it is the same thing that bounds everything else here - the daily earning cap and the 5-per-wallet primary mint limit cap how much any one actor can extract this way. It is not a fund-loss bug; it is a distribution edge, and we would rather name it than let you find it.
2. The lifetime caps are ceilings, not promises
The tiers advertise lifetime caps of 4.0x / 6.0x / 8.0x the mint price. These are the points at which a miner stops earning. They are not projections, targets, or expectations.
Here is the arithmetic, for the live (Set U) parameters:
- Sum of all advertised lifetime caps, per ticker: 109 ETH.
- Maximum money that can ever reach holders on that ticker, even at a full sellout: about 20 ETH.
- The pool can fund roughly 18% of the caps it displays. The caps are approximately 5.45x oversized relative to the money that could ever pay them.
Most miners will never reach their lifetime cap. In our simulations, only early cohorts got close. If you are reading "8.0x lifetime cap" as a number you might one day hold, you have misread it. It is a ceiling on how much a miner is permitted to earn before it burns out, and the aggregate of those permissions is a promise the money cannot keep.
We considered lowering the caps to numbers the pool could actually fund. We chose instead to keep them and tell you this. If you would rather we had lowered them, that is a reasonable position and the governance forum is open.
3. Smart-contract risk
The contracts have been audited internally - by our own security review process, across every phase of the build, with findings fixed and re-tested.
An external, independent audit is pending and has not been completed. We are not going to claim otherwise, and you should not treat "audited" without a qualifier as meaning what it usually means. Until an external audit is published, the code has been reviewed by the people who wrote it and by no one else.
Smart contracts can contain bugs that no amount of review finds. A bug in the pool accounting, the cap enforcement, the marketplace escrow, or the adapters could cost you everything in the protocol. There is no insurance that covers this - see §4 for what the "Insurance Fund" actually is and isn't.
4. The Insurance Fund is small. Much smaller than its name suggests.
5% of every mint and 30% of the treasury bucket go to an "Insurance Fund" intended to backstop pools if inflows stall.
Our own simulator (the Set U figure sheet) found that the mint-fee treasury tops out at roughly 13.2 ETH protocol-wide (~$24.8k) for an entire year in the best (growth) case - and just 0.99 ETH in a bust - and the insurance fund it feeds ends the year holding about 0.33 ETH (growth), or 0.017 ETH in a bust.
That is not a backstop. It is a rounding error. At current parameters, the Insurance Fund cannot meaningfully defend a pool against a stall, and you should not factor it into any decision. We are disclosing this rather than letting the word "insurance" do work it hasn't earned. Making it real would require seeding it from the $EQUIMINE treasury allocation or an ETH endowment - that is a governance decision that has not been made.
The same report finds that mint fees cannot fund operations either - the mint-fee treasury covers only about 1.2 months of protocol operations in the best case (and days in a bust); the protocol runs on the 15% $EQUIMINE treasury allocation and marketplace fees.
5. Chain risk: a single sequencer
Equimine is built on Robinhood Chain, an Arbitrum Orbit L2 that settles to Ethereum.
It runs a single, Robinhood-operated sequencer. In principle, that operator can censor or reorder transactions, and if the sequencer goes down, the chain stops producing blocks. Your claims, your sales, and your votes stop with it. This is a liveness and censorship risk that does not exist on a decentralized chain, and it is not one we can mitigate - we can only tell you it's there.
Withdrawals to Ethereum L1 go through the standard Arbitrum canonical bridge, with a 7-day challenge period. Getting value out of the chain is not instant.
6. Tokenized-stock issuer risk
The tokens in our vaults, and the tokens you are paid in, are Robinhood Stock Tokens. Understand precisely what they are.
They are tokenized debt securities - not shares. They are issued by Robinhood Assets (Jersey) Ltd and track the economic performance of the underlying stock only. Holding one does not make you a shareholder of Alphabet or Tesla. You have no shareholder rights, no voting rights, and no ownership - no direct claim on the company. What you hold is an issuer's debt obligation whose value references a stock, issued by a third party we do not control.
Getting cash out is gated. Direct cash redemption of these tokens is restricted to Authorized Participants - not retail holders. The way you realise value in practice is by selling the token into the secondary DEX pools on Robinhood Chain, the same pools our claims swap through. Those secondary pools are thin (see §1 and §7), so the price you can actually exit at may move against you - and for a large position, may move a lot.
We read the contracts on-chain. Here is what the issuer can do:
- Pause all transfers, globally or on an oracle signal (e.g. a market halt). If this happens, your rewards are deferred and retryable, never lost - but you cannot get them out until the pause lifts.
- Block any address. The tokens use a sanctions deny-list. An address on it cannot send or receive.
- Burn tokens from any holder (
adminBurn, role-gated). Including, in principle, from our vaults. - Rebase balances on corporate actions such as stock splits. These are not fixed-balance ERC-20s.
Our architecture quarantines these failure modes to the delivery boundary - minting never depends on a stock being live, and pool accounting is in ETH, so a pause or a rebase cannot corrupt the ledger. But it cannot make issuer risk go away. If a stock token is permanently paused, delisted, or admin-burned, the protocol's fallback is a governance-declared emergency mode that reverts that ticker to ETH payouts. That is a mitigation, not a guarantee.
7. You carry price risk between minting and claiming
Your reward accrues in ETH and is converted to the tokenized stock at the moment you claim. How much stock your ETH buys depends on the market when you claim, not when you minted.
Each claim is a real swap: it pays a DEX fee, it suffers slippage, and it is exposed to MEV. Those costs are yours. The app bounds slippage at 1% by default and you can change it, but you cannot make the cost zero. In our Set U modelling a single $100 claim costs about 5 bps on the deepest pool (NVDA), 45 bps on AMD, and ~104 bps (1.0%) on the thinnest (GOOGL) - at or under ~1% even on the thinnest book. A larger claim on a thin pool costs proportionally more, and the whale daily cap is now $200, so a full-cap whale claim on GOOGL costs roughly double the figure above.
Stock claims settle 24/7 - but off-hours claims carry a wider price band. The native Chainlink stock feeds only update while the US market is open (24/5). You can still claim any time: during market hours the swap gets the tight 3% price protection; off-hours (evenings, weekends, holidays) it settles against the last-known market price with a wider ~5% band and no live price check, so you may get a slightly worse rate. The downside is bounded by your daily cap - about $1.50 / $4 / $10 per off-hours claim (penny / blue chip / whale, being ~5% of the $30 / $80 / $200 caps). In a large adverse weekend gap it can be worse than that: if the on-chain pool has repriced while the feed was dark, the loss can exceed the band by roughly the size of the gap, bounded above by your tier's full daily cap. Crucially it falls only on your own reward (never other miners, the pool, or the treasury), only materialises if an off-hours MEV bot is active, and is avoidable by claiming during market hours. ETH settles 24/7 with no band. (A feed outage longer than ~96 hours - well beyond any weekend - still defers.)
Separately: the daily caps are dollar-denominated but enforced through a governance-set ETH/USD rate behind a 48-hour timelock - not a live oracle. The cap is a governance-pegged dollar equivalent. If ETH moves sharply, your cap is temporarily loose or tight in real terms until governance catches up.
8. Regulatory and geographic risk
Equimine applies no geographic restriction. We do not geo-fence, and we block no country. Wherever you are, nothing on our side stops you connecting a wallet and minting.
Read that as what it is: the removal of a control, not the removal of a risk. It is not a statement that this is legal where you live. Whether it is lawful for you to participate - under the securities, gambling, consumer-protection and tax law that applies to you - is your responsibility to determine, and yours alone. We have not made that assessment for your country and we are not making it for you. If you need advice, get it from someone qualified in your own jurisdiction, before you buy anything.
Be clear about what that costs you. Products in this category commonly block the United States and the United Kingdom. We do not. So the filter that would otherwise have kept you out of a product your regulator may take a dim view of is not there, and the exposure it existed to manage now sits with you, in a jurisdiction we have not checked. You are less protected here, not more.
Tokenized equities and reward mechanics sit on live regulatory surface - MiCA in the EU, and securities law generally. The legal treatment of this product is unsettled - in every jurisdiction, including yours. That surface is moving. A regulator could take a view of this product that makes it impossible to operate in a jurisdiction, including yours, with no notice. Because we do not geo-fence, nothing warns you in advance that yours is one of them.
The tickers are real trademarks belonging to real companies. Equimine is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or connected to Alphabet, Tesla, Robinhood, SpaceX, or any other company whose ticker appears in the game.
Legal review is ongoing and is a condition of mainnet launch.
9. Governance risk
Voting weight is sqrt(staked $EQUIMINE), per wallet, and there is no proof-of-personhood layer. Splitting a stake across N wallets multiplies voting power by roughly √N. Someone determined enough to run 25 wallets at the 10,000 $EQUIMINE threshold gets about five times the voting power of the same tokens held in one wallet.
We disclose this in full in mechanics.md §7. It is inherent to quadratic voting without identity. The blast radius is bounded - the only thing a vote can do is promote a ticker from a pre-approved list - but it is a real weakness in a real system.
Protocol parameters and treasury movements sit behind a 3-of-5 multisig and a 48-hour timelock. That means five named humans, three of whom can queue a change that executes two days later. It is a check, not a decentralization claim, and we are not going to describe it as one.
10. The short version
- Payouts come from purchases. If purchases stop, payouts fall.
- Buying late is, in every scenario we modelled, substantially worse than buying early. The typical (median) buyer recovers ~0.64x of their mint price; roughly 69% of buyers never break even; only the top ~30% do.
- The lifetime caps are ceilings the aggregate money cannot fund. Most miners will never reach them.
- The external audit is not done.
- The insurance fund is too small to insure anything.
- The chain has one sequencer.
- The stock tokens are tokenized debt securities - no ownership, no vote - whose issuer can pause, block, burn, and rebase them; cash redemption is gated to Authorized Participants, and the secondary pools you exit through are thin.
- We block no country and we do not geo-fence. Whether participating is lawful where you live is yours to determine - and the legal treatment of this product is unsettled everywhere, including where you are.
- You could lose everything you put in.
Equimine is a game with transparent rules and a real, disclosed house edge. Play it because you want to play it. Don't play it because you think it's an income stream - it isn't one, we have never called it one, and we have published the simulation that shows why.
Nothing on this page or anywhere in Equimine's documentation is investment advice, a projection of returns, or an offer. Equimine does not promise, project, or imply any return. We apply no geographic restriction and do not geo-fence: whether it is lawful for you to participate where you live is yours to determine - see §8.